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Abstract 
Adaptive management as defined by Lee (1999) places learning at the heart of 
environmental governance and presents experimentation as a leading enabler of 
learning. This article calls for attention to so-called policy experiments, and posits a 
definition of a policy experiment that best suits the needs of adaptive governance. It is 
argued that an experiment is essentially a policy tool that simultaneously enables and 
tests innovation in a temporary space. Although learning is described as the key 
objective in adaptive governance, and experimentation has often been implied in 
suggestions to enhance such learning, little is known about the relationship between 
experimentation and learning at the conceptual level. Therefore we develop a 
conceptual framework composed with an institutional perspective to help address this 
situation. The framework suggests that initiators of experiments need to take various 
interrelated design decisions when setting up an experiment and we delineate three 
ideal types of experiments: the technocratic, boundary, and advocacy experiment.  
These types are expected to produce different levels of learning effects, both within 
the experiment and the wider policy network. We tentatively suggest that technocratic 
experiments can be expected to produce high levels of cognitive learning, no 
normative learning and low levels of relational learning; and that the results from the 
experiment will be considered credible. Boundary experiments on the other hand 
create high levels of normative and relational learning, but lower levels of cognitive 
learning. They will score high on legitimacy and salience, but poorer on credibility.  
Finally, advocacy experiments lead to some cognitive and relational learning, but low 
levels of normative learning. Their findings will suffer in terms of credibility and 
legitimacy, but the salience might, under certain circumstances, be strong. To assess 
the usefulness of our framework and to provide for an initial test of our theoretical 
propositions, the framework is applied to a case study of an experiment conducted in 
the Netherlands. Application of our framework there brings some surprising results, 
with potential implications for the academic debate on experiments and the science-
policy interface more broadly. We conclude by sketching some limitations of our 
research and by suggesting further research priorities in the field.   
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1 Introduction 
Until recently, climate governance has relied on developing measures that attempt to 
mitigate the effects of a changing global climate. Adaptation, however, is now gaining 
traction as a vital part of the preparation, and a greater understanding is needed about 
how to govern adaptively (Termeer et al 2011). Adaptive governance is a field that 
offers a potentially useful perspective, in particular the notions of experimentation and 
learning (Folke et al 2005, Cooney and Lang 2007, Huitema et al 2009).  
The planet’s ecosystems are characterised by non-reducibility, variability, and a 
collective quality (Dryzek 1987), and the uncertainty inherent in these dynamic 
conditions may be addressed in part by the reversibility and exploratory nature of 
public policy experimentation (Millo and Lezaun 2006). In many social-ecological 
systems governments and their policies play an important role in the prevention and 
resolution of climate change related issues, and policy experiments are specific 
temporary institutional arrangements that operate in the development phase of the 
policy cycle. An advantage of experiments is that their temporary nature allows policy 
makers to learn about the effects of an intervention without fully committing to a 
course of action, thereby reducing uncertainty while maintaining flexibility.  
The notion of experimentation was appealing in the decades after the Second World 
War, because that period was optimistic about the capacity of governments to provide 
for collective goods, and much was expected from science as guidance for policy 
making (Merton 1973, Campbell 1998). However, when the social engineering role of 
the state and the positive role of science in policy making were confronted (Dryzek 
1993), the notion of experimenting lost support too. In the policy sciences field, 
experiments were equated with a positivistic, non-reflexive approach to policy making, 
with questionable validity and serious ethical consequences (see especially Fischer 
1995, Vedung 1998, Martin and Sanderson 1999, Sanderson 2002, Greenberg et al. 
2003). Although there are areas of public policy (social policy, education, health) 
where experiments have continued to hold appeal over the years as the gold standard 
of evidence-based policy making (Haynes et al. 2012), it is interesting to see 
experiments emerging in the discussion on environmental policy and governance. 
Experiments unite the adaptive management and adaptive co-management literatures 
(see e.g. Lee 1993, Folke et al. 2005, Armitage et al. 2008, Huitema et al. 2009) as an 
approach that tests hypotheses about alternative management interventions, and they 
are increasingly seen as an important ingredient of a learning approach in innovations 
and transitions management (Huitema and Meijerink 2009, Berkhout et al. 2010, Voss 
and Bornemann 2011). While, in the adaptive management literature, experiments are 
equated with the provision of data on the effectiveness of interventions, this literature 
also suggests that experiments play a role in the work of ‘shadow networks’- informal, 
collaborative networks- that pave the way for transitions in government policy 
(Gunderson, 1999).  
This endorsement of experiments, not only in academic circles but also in practice, 
makes research on the actual effects of experiments increasingly necessary. This paper 
is one contribution and it explores the relationship between policy experiment design 
on the one hand and learning on the other, and proposes a framework that can be 
used to systematically analyse their interaction. Throughout the adaptive governance 
literature, experiments and learning are consistently linked; for example, Armitage et 
al. (2008) describe experiments as a learning mechanism, which can produce 
experiential and reflexive learning-by-doing processes. Experiments are expected to 
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quicken the pace of learning; however there are technical, resource, and ethical risks 
to bear with active experimentation. Lee (1999) and Walters and Holling (1990) also 
discuss experimentation as a form of learning-by-doing where theoretical propositions 
are tested in the field. However, building a framework that unifies the two concepts is 
novel, and even experiments themselves have seldom been analysed in a rigorous and 
systematic way (some exceptions are Greenberg et al. 2003, Vreugdenhil et al. 2010, 
Farrelly and Brown 2011, Castán Broto and Bulkeley 2013). Learning is understood 
here as the normatively desirable outcome of experimentation, and is therefore 
expected to achieve a lot, including resolving conflict and enabling decision making in 
uncertain situations (Diduck 2010). Despite this, little is written about prescriptions 
that bring these effects about, particularly in the writings on experiments. One source 
of potential understanding here is the social learning literature, where institutional 
factors such as information dissemination, diverse participation, and power diffusion 
are identified as enablers of learning (Mostert et al. 2007, Muro and Jeffrey 2012). 
These factors can be translated into features of experimental design and grouped in 
specific configurations, which is what is attempted below. 
This article is structured as follows: first, the framework is laid out, introducing 
concept definitions and, based on the literature, the variables used for systematic 
comparison. It is contended that the notion of policy experiment is underdeveloped, 
and could use a dose of conceptual clarity. Second, institutional design choices are 
grouped by distinguishing ‘ideal type’ experiments, and a proposition regarding how 
these types relate to learning is outlined. Third, the framework is tested using a case 
study example of a policy experiment in the Netherlands. How the results meet 
expectations and what they mean for the validity of the framework is discussed. Fourth 
the limitations to this research are considered. The conclusion remarks on the case 
study as a policy experiment with ideas for future research. 
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2 Analytical framework 
2.1 Experimenting with public policy 
Despite being relevant to a variety of academic fields, public policy experiments are 
difficult to readily identify. Both conceptual and empirical analyses of experiments are 
rather limited, although currently a small body of literature is experiencing growth as 
experiments emerge as a tool to meet humanity’s needs of addressing complex policy 
issues, such as water and climate change mitigation (Farrelly and Brown, 2011; Castán 
Broto and Bulkeley 2013). In their analysis of adaptive co-management prescriptions, 
Huitema et al. (2009) identify two interpretations of experimentation: an approach to 
management and as a research methodology. Adaptive management is therefore 
understood as both an experimental process (similar to Sabel and Zeitlin’s 
‘experimentalist governance’- Sabel and Zeitlin, 2011) and a method to produce 
reliable and valid information for policy making by testing management interventions 
in practice (see Lee 1999, Cook et al. 2004, Armitage et al. 2008). This second, 
evaluative function also defines the experiment as understood in political science, 
where project interventions with a classic experimental design (i.e. with randomisation 
and control groups) are expected to provide reliable evidence of “what really works”, 
and thereby lead to evidence-based policy making (Rondinelli 1993, Campbell 1998, 
Millo and Lezaun 2006, Stoker 2010, Haynes et al. 2012).  
A third interpretation is possible: that of acting outside of established rules. This way 
of looking at experiments recognizes novelty, and advocates for the release of 
incumbent laws and processes to produce an experimental space where new 
innovations can emerge. For example, an experimental ‘niche’ provides a protected 
space to innovate, bring actors together, and build the means to upscale a project into 
the mainstream (Berkhout et al. 2010). Climate change experiments, as conceptualised 
by Castán Broto and Bulkeley (2013), are interventions that innovate and focus on 
learning, and are identified by the fact they sit beyond the processes of official policy 
making.  
For adaptive governance, an experiment is expected to generate alternative solutions 
to emerging problems (Olsson et al. 2006), so testing new ideas ‘outside of the 
ordinary’ is vital. However, it is argued here that there is a certain level of commitment 
needed if initiators want to experiment; they must be open to failure. To enable the 
possibility of failure, an experimenter must establish some control; at the very least a 
monitoring programme that allows the evaluation of the proposal’s effects. In this way, 
experiments are distinguishable from other innovative projects. Drawing together the 
notions described above, an experiment is thus understood as a temporary, limited 
space of observation and control that provides a degree of systematic assessment of 
innovative policy ideas. It needs to both enable and test innovative concepts. 
Reflecting on an experiment’s relationship to policy, Millo and Lezaun (2006) identify 
different modalities of experiments; including pilot programs, regulatory impact 
assessments, and field trials, which can be applied as policy approaches, mechanisms, 
instruments, and concepts. Experimenting with policy may be direct, like adopting a 
completely new policy instrument; or indirect- like testing new concepts or 
management interventions where results will have an impact on deciding the intended 
course of a policy.  
These applications should be captured in a broad understanding of a policy 
experiment, and bringing both the experimental and the policy strands together, this 
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article defines policy experimentation as “a temporary, controlled field-trial of a policy-
relevant innovation that produces evidence for subsequent policy decisions”. 
Recently in this journal, Munaretto and Huitema (2012) assessed how experiments 
impact learning in an analysis of Venice lagoon. They concluded that experiments have 
the potential to produce both factual and reflexive learning because of the repeated 
interactions of actors, which enables the actors to deal with uncertainty and change 
(Munaretto and Huitema 2012). The framework developed here takes this observation 
a step further by attempting to assess whether a variety of factors produce learning, 
and its structure is described in the following section. 
2.2 Experiment ideal types  
In order to understand how the design of an experiment influences its learning effects, 
we imagine that the institutional rules of an experiment are essentially choices to be 
made when designing the experiment. Institutional rules are presented in the rule 
typology developed by Ostrom (2005) in the Institutional Analysis and Development 
Framework, and include the boundary, position, information, choice, aggregation, 
payoff, and scope rules. Focusing on institutional rules allows us to compare 
experiments with quite different characteristics. Table 1 describes six of the rules as 
defined by Ostrom (2005) and links them to choices that may be made when designing 
experiments: 
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Table 1 Institutional rules and their relation to experimental design.  
Rule type Rule definition Design choice 
Boundary 
(entry or exit) 
Delineates who participates by 
defining how participants enter the 
experiment and what makes them 
eligible. 
Deciding on what makes a 
participant eligible to participate 
and how others are blocked from 
participating.  
 Determines how open the access is to 
an experiment. 
Deciding in what way an actor can 
gain access to the experiment- by 
invitation from the initiator or 
through making a request. 
Position Assigns participants with a position in 
the experiment. The minimum number 
of positions is one- that of participant 
in the experiment. 
The number of participants 
allocated as initiator, designer, 
implementer, and evaluator. 
Decision whether to include a 
facilitator; whether there is more 
than one party financing the 
experiment. 
Information Information rules prescribe the 
subjects or types of information that 
can be communicated. 
Whether the experiment considers 
non-expert information valid, such 
as experiences and local 
knowledge; or only expert 
information. Whether reflexive 
forms of information are 
generated or only instrumental 
forms. 
 Rules that prescribe the channels of 
information flow and frequency of 
communication. 
How open the communication is, 
how frequently information is 
distributed, and how it is 
distributed.  
Choice Rules that prescribe what actions a 
participant can or cannot perform at 
particular node points in the process. 
How power is distributed among 
participants, how much influence 
they have over significant points in 
the experiment; being the design, 
implementation, and evaluation 
processes.  
Aggregation Prescribe how collective decisions are 
made by individuals. If two or more 
participants have decision rights, the 
collective decision can be made either 
by majority or by consensus. 
How the experiment assigns 
control over decision making, the 
weighting of each participant’s 
decision making power 
Payoff Manage the distribution of costs and 
benefits. 
Where funding comes from. 
 
Ostrom (2005) warns that indefinite institutional configurations can result from 
various possible settings of the rules, so for the purposes of this investigation, 
examples of experiments are categorised using ideal types (Weber 1968). The ideal 
types are developed as a heuristic device to anchor the rule configurations into three 
main groups, thereby structuring the empirical investigation. These three types are 
theoretically shaped by diametric approaches to policy development and analysis- the 
technocratic and interpretive approaches (Fischer 2007), as well as a model of the 
science-policy interface that classifies different roles of science in policy making (Pielke 
Jr. 2007). These ideal types underscore different ways the rules can be set, and are 
hyper-rational courses of action against which real-world examples can be 
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approximated to varying degrees (Weber 1968; Dryzek 1987). It is emphasised that as 
models, they cover the essential details of policy experiments, but are not all 
encompassing, as illustrated in the case study below. The remainder of this section 
describes the three types and Table 2 summarises the differences in rule settings 
between them.  
Technocratic ideal type 
The technocratic experiment follows the rational model of policy decision making 
where the technocratic elite generate expert knowledge for policy decisions (Fischer 
2007). A discerning feature is the determined separation of facts and values, with the 
normative perspective decided at the outset by elected politicians or their policy 
advisors, and effectively tested in reality. The experiment then sidesteps conflicts in 
goals and values (Fischer 2007) although it is suggested that complete separation of 
fact and value is impossible to attain (Dryzek 1993, Fischer 1995). The role of a 
technocratic experiment in policy development resembles what is termed the ‘pure 
scientist’ or ‘science arbiter’ (Pielke Jr. 2007). In this arrangement, the experiment 
produces scientific information with little or no connection to the policy process until 
the end, when the results are presented to decision makers. This arrangement 
separates science from policy decision making and helps reinforce the view that 
science is impartial to politics, which upholds the scientific integrity of the evidence 
but may compromise its policy relevance.  
Boundary ideal type 
A boundary experiment represents a deliberative, inclusive design for producing policy 
relevant evidence. It is so named due to its role as a boundary object (Star and 
Grisemer 1989), engaging participants in a deliberative process and withdrawing their 
knowledge and normative perspective on the policy proposal being tested (Dryzek 
1987). Ideally, this engagement will allow different interpretations of the policy 
problem to emerge that build into a common consensus on the most appropriate 
course of action. A range of state and non-state actors participate, and the knowledge 
of non-experts has value in the process, including anecdotal, traditional, and other 
contextual forms of shared information (Lindblom and Cohen 1979, Funtowicz and 
Ravetz 1990). There are no restrictions on what information is shared or who it is 
shared with, and all participants have authority to influence the problem definition, 
and design, monitoring, and evaluation choices. The role of the experiment resembles 
the ‘honest broker of policy alternatives’ (Pielke Jr. 2007), where it engages with the 
policy process and develops policy solutions in accordance with multiple value-
perspectives.  
Advocacy ideal type 
An advocacy experiment generates evidence that supports pre-defined policy goals. 
Non-critical participants are selected who are involved in the policy issue and who 
already know each other. The initiator maintains control over the evidence produced 
so evidence that disputes the proposal is suppressed, and only knowledge that 
supports the proposal is shared. Policy goals are not up for debate since they were 
decided in advance by the initiator. In regards to its relationship with policy, the 
experiment resembles a ‘(stealth) issue advocate’ (Pielke Jr. 2007) where it narrows the 
policy options to the preferred course of action. Campbell (1998) considers why 
initiators might choose to design an advocacy experiment and surmises that the effort 
of organising a project that confronts an established way of doing something risks 
‘institutional inertia’ and thus any chance of failure is suppressed. Another explanation 
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is that an initiator believes they are right, and wants an opportunity to prove it, under 
the guise of “testing” something (see also Sanderson 2002).  
Table 2 Policy experiment ideal types.  
Rule type 
Technocratic 
experiment 
Boundary experiment Advocacy experiment 
Boundary  Participants are experts 
that contribute 
scientific or 
professional expertise. 
No procedures are 
established that will 
allow involvement of 
non-expert 
participants. 
Procedures allow for 
scientific and professional 
experts, state actors, and 
non-state actors such as 
business and industry 
representatives and 
ordinary citizens, to 
participate in the 
experiment. 
Rule settings allow for 
scientific and 
professional experts, 
state actors, and non-
state actors such as 
business and industry 
representatives and 
ordinary citizens, to 
participate in the 
experiment, as long as 
they support the 
intervention and are 
known by the initiator. 
 Entry into the 
experiment is by 
invitation from the 
initiator. 
Entry is open to anyone 
who makes a valid 
request. 
Entry into the 
experiment is by 
invitation from the 
initiator. 
Position No facilitator position 
is created. 
A facilitator position is 
available. 
No facilitator position is 
created. 
Information Produces expert- 
particularly scientific- 
information about the 
effectiveness of the 
intervention. 
Information is wholly 
instrumental. 
Produces expert, and non-
scientific (lay) information 
about the effectiveness of 
the intervention. Infor-
mation is instrumental as 
well as reflexive (e.g. 
stakeholder perspectives 
on the suitability of the 
intervention for public 
policy). 
Produces mainly non-
expert (lay) information 
and restricted expert 
information that 
supports the pre-defined 
ends. Does not generate 
reflexive information. 
 Channels of 
communication are 
open to all participants. 
Communication outside 
the experiment is 
minimal. 
Channels of commu-
nication are open to all 
participants. 
Communication outside 
the experiment is regular. 
Channels of 
communication are 
restricted among 
participants. Media 
reports are used to 
advocate the position. 
 Information is 
distributed to 
participants using 
formal methods but not 
informal methods; e.g. 
no face-to-face 
workshops. 
Information is distributed 
frequently using formal 
and informal methods; 
e.g. face-to-face 
workshops. 
Information is not 
distributed to all 
participants, unpopular 
information is 
suppressed. 
Choice  Initiator retains control 
over each decision 
node, with participants 
contributing their 
expertise when 
requested. 
All participants have full 
decision making powers at 
each node point. 
Initiator makes decisions 
at all nodes with minimal 
consultation with other 
participants. 
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Rule type 
Technocratic 
experiment 
Boundary experiment Advocacy experiment 
Aggregation Majority decision 
making by a group of 
expert participants 
selected by the 
initiator. 
Decisions are made by 
consensus. 
Majority decision making 
by self-appointed group 
of participants. 
Payoff State initiator or 
research body pays all 
costs. 
Experiment requests buy-
in from all participants 
within reason. 
Dominant party pays all 
costs. 
 
In summary, the three ideal types of experiment each represent alternative methods of 
policy development with divergent configurations of participants, information, and 
power distributions. Experiments could be examined in other ways; for instance, by 
their differing impacts on the policy process (e.g. Greenberg et al. 2003), but by 
dissecting their institutional variables, learning effects can be systematically examined 
using pre-established factors that are said to influence learning. This is the strength of 
the framework, and it will be critically evaluated in the case study below. First, 
however, exactly what is meant by ‘learning’ is outlined. 
2.3 Policy learning 
Learning has an extensive and varied scholarship and in order to position the scope of 
our research, we draw on the dimensions of learning earmarked by Bennett and 
Howlett (1992): learning what, by whom, and to what effect. Regarding the first 
question, we understand that when someone learns, they are making sense of the 
world by acquiring new knowledge, or changing their perceptions at an individual level 
(Newig et al. 2010). Since the focus here is on the policy process and thus on policy 
learning, the following definition is adopted: “relatively enduring alterations of thought 
or behavioural intentions that result from experience and that are concerned with the 
attainment (or revision) of public policy” (Sabatier 1987). Following Haug et al. (2011) 
we distinguish three forms of policy learning: cognitive learning as the gaining of new 
knowledge and improved restructuring of existing knowledge; normative learning that 
captures an individual’s deeper understanding of the policy process, and requires 
reflection on, and changes in, their perspective, goals, or priorities; and relational 
learning, which is defined as an increase in trust, an improved ability to cooperate, and 
a better understanding of the mindsets and frames of other participants. These 
categories are considered useful to empirically delineate between different learning 
evidence without conceptualising one as deeper, or more essential, than another. All 
are fundamental to environmental governance; for example, information is important 
to the policy process due to its advocacy and enlightenment functions (Grin and 
Loeber 2007, Sabatier 1978). High normative learning may indicate a synthesis of 
priorities between individuals about the policy issue and development of a common 
interest or goal within the group, leading to political consensus and collective action 
(Leach et al. 2013). Poteete, Janssen and Ostrom (2010) underline the importance of 
trust in governing social-ecological systems, and relational learning mirrors the goal of 
moral development (Webler et al. 1995) which enables participants to consider 
alternative perspectives and better cooperate with one another.  
Regarding the question of “who learns?”, the unit of analysis used here is learning at 
the individual level, because it is considered that only individuals can learn, although a 
culmination of their learning experiences can be taken as learning by the group as a 
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whole. Our research focuses on the learning effects in two different spaces. The first 
space consists of those engaged in the experiment itself- the participants of the 
experiment. Depending on the design of the experiment, this circle may contain just 
state actors or non-state actors as well. The second space involves state actors in the 
relevant policy environment, that is, the bureaucrats and decision makers engaged 
with the issue at hand.  
As for the question “to what effect does learning take place?” there are different 
approaches in the literature on policy learning, with the dominant one equating 
learning with actual policy change (Bennett and Howlett 1992, Hall 1993, Busenberg 
2001). However, it is recognised here that such change may occur without learning 
(i.e. with bargaining or negotiation), and learning can take place without policy change, 
such as being part of the development of shared understandings and mutual 
agreements (Leach et al. 2013). In connection with the questions on who learns and to 
what effect, there is a marked difference between learning amongst those involved in 
the experiment and learning amongst the wider circle of policy makers. The learning 
effects in the first group are expected to be relatively direct, and can thus be gauged 
immediately after an experiment has ended. The effects of experiments in policy 
circles, however, are likely to be indirect and protracted (see e.g. Weiss 1977). In order 
to gain insights in learning at the end of the experiment, the decision was made to use 
proxy indicators for learning that are known from the science-policy interface literature 
(particularly Cash et al. 2002). These indicators are the credibility, salience, and 
legitimacy of the experiment’s findings on the relevant policy environment in the eyes 
of policy makers (Cash et al 2003). Credibility refers to the degree to which policy 
makers consider the findings of the experiment authoritative and believable, and to 
the degree in which they trust the outcomes. Salience refers to the relevance of the 
experiment findings at a certain moment in time. Legitimacy refers to the degree to 
which an information producing process was fair and whether it considered 
appropriate values, concerns, and perspectives of different actors (Cash et al. 2002.). 
These indicators are chosen here because they are well established in the literature, 
and because it is expected that fulfilling these criteria better will lead to higher 
learning effects in the longer run. Also, it has been suggested that it is difficult to 
maximize all three criteria (ibid.), and attempts to improve one criterion might actually 
lead to lower scores for the other criteria. This is attractive from the perspective of the 
current research as the various types of experiments might actually be geared to score 
well on different criteria and thus lead to learning effects amongst policy makers in 
diverging ways.  
2.4 Relating experiment design to learning 
The framework aims to assess how an experiment’s design can influence cognitive, 
normative, and relational learning effects amongst the participants, as well as the 
perceived credibility, salience, and legitimacy of the experimental findings amongst 
policy makers. To build hypotheses on how experimental design and learning are 
related, use is made of the significant theoretical and empirical advances made in this 
journal that explain learning and suggest what sorts of variables, when brought 
together, will enable it (e.g. Mostert et al. 2007; Pahl‐Wostl et al. 2007; Newig et al. 
2010; Rodela 2011; Muro and Jeffrey 2012). For example, Mostert et al. (2007) outline 
a list of 71 factors in 8 themes that they found hinder or enable learning. The factors 
included independent facilitation, dissemination of information, joint planning and 
influence over the process, diverse but limited numbers of participants, common 
understanding, and frequent discussions. These factors have since been utilised as 
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independent variables in other learning studies (e.g. Muro and Jeffrey 2012), but for 
the purposes of this article, they are applied to the rules that describe an experimental 
design in particular. The main claim proposed by the framework is that since 
institutional rules can be configured so that they distinguish three experiment ideal 
types, and since, as explained above, learning is influenced by rule settings, the ideal 
types create different learning effects. Based on this and other work, the following 
hypotheses and supporting explanations are proffered: 
Hypothesis 1:  A technocratic experiment produces high levels of cognitive learning, no 
normative learning, and limited relational learning within the circle of 
participants in the experiment. In the broader policy environment, the 
experiment’s findings will be considered very credible, but they will not 
be considered salient or very legitimate.  
The reasoning underpinning this hypothesis is essentially that the emphasis of this 
experiment type is on building scientific expertise. The additional assumptions made 
are that the experiments will be initiated with the objectives already set, which means 
that an experiment is based on chosen points of debate within a paradigm, and that 
the theory tested in the experiment conforms to that paradigm. As the boundary rules 
preclude the entry of actors with different ideas, the information rules emphasize 
expertise that is fitting with that paradigm, as well as emphasise progress within the 
established paradigm, the experiment design precludes normative learning and 
produces learning that is mostly factual (cognitive). Due to the information rules 
allowing open communication and not suppressing information, there might be some 
relational learning in the process, but the form that this takes is more internal-
scientific (who is best at solving the puzzle at hand, who can understand the system 
best) and not about creating higher levels of trust in a policy network. As for the 
perception of such experiments by the policy world, the funding for the experiment 
(pay-off rules) is likely to be from organizations with a purely scientific interest, that 
do not care greatly about policy relevant outcomes but more about scientific 
publications. The implication is that any salience of the outcomes is therefore probably 
a coincidental outcome. The closed character of the experiment makes the legitimacy 
of the results questionable as the research question, data gathering process, and 
report writing has not involved stakeholder groups or ordinary citizens and might not 
address arguments they consider important. A high level of credibility is expected 
here, in the very simple assumptions that scientific information is developed according 
to the highest standards of reliability, and that scientific information is perceived to be 
credible in general.  
Hypothesis 2:  A boundary experiment produces medium levels of cognitive learning 
and high levels of normative and relational learning within the circle of 
participants in the experiment. In the broader policy environment, the 
experiment’s findings will be considered moderately or very salient and 
very legitimate, but not very credible.  
This hypothesis is based on the open design of a boundary experiment, where the 
boundary rules are set so broadly they include all stakeholders that want to 
participate. This enables participant diversity, which is considered a trigger of learning 
in learning analyses (Schusler et al. 2003, Mostert et al. 2007, Muro and Jeffrey 2008, 
Gerlak and Heikkila 2011, Leach et al. 2013). Participants are exposed to a variety of 
ideas and understandings of the policy problem, which are shared amongst the group 
through open and transparent information rules. Through the authority rules, non-
state actors influence the setting of the problem definition and experiment goals, 
which increases the probability of public support for the intervention and the 
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generation of shared norms. Since there is no dominant paradigm through which to 
view the problem, a kaleidoscope of perspectives shapes the experiment paradigm, 
creating possibilities for normative learning. The focus on capturing different 
knowledge types- e.g. non-expert lay knowledge about the system within which the 
experiment is embedded- enhances the breadth of understanding about the 
experiment’s effects, but undermines understanding of in-depth complexities, thereby 
hampering cognitive learning. Participants have decision power through authority rules 
to influence the evaluation process, thereby capturing a wide variety of concerns and 
generating trust in the political process- relational learning- through participants 
feeling their needs are being met (Dryzek 1987, Webler et al. 1995, Mostert et al. 
2007, Muro and Jeffrey 2012). Within the policy network, boundary experiments are 
perceived as very legitimate, because the focus on stakeholder interests and 
establishing ways to meet those interests ensures the findings meet the expectations 
of society; however, the drawback of this design is that non-expert knowledge 
undermines the technical quality of the experiment findings meaning credibility is not 
perceived as very high. If the policy network is ‘in tune’ with the current norms of 
society, then the findings will be considered very salient, but if the policy network is 
responding to cues other than societal norms (e.g. international, economic, political 
influences), the findings will be moderately salient.  
Hypothesis 3:  An advocacy experiment produces medium levels of cognitive learning, 
low normative learning, and low to medium levels of relational learning. 
In the broader policy environment, the experiment’s findings will be 
considered salient (under some circumstances) but they will not be 
considered very credible or legitimate.  
This hypothesis reflects the intention of the advocacy experiment to demonstrate a 
pre-defined policy solution as the most suitable course of action. Boundary rules allow 
entry to a potentially diverse set of participants, but access is limited to those chosen 
by the initiator, restricting eligibility to those who support the proposal. Diverse actors 
contribute knowledge (Hegger et al. 2012, Muro and Jeffrey 2012) so there is some 
cognitive learning, and persuasion tactics might trigger slight normative learning 
(Haug et al. 2011), but not the same levels that sharing a breadth of viewpoints might 
(Schusler et al. 2003). Both types of learning are inhibited by the lack of open and 
regular lines of communication (Muro and Jeffrey 2012). Due to the participants 
knowing each other and having similar views, there is potential for some relational 
learning, but no new actor networks emerge and the suppression of certain 
information and lack of authority for most participants inhibits trust building. The 
perception of an advocacy experiment is that its credibility and legitimacy are 
questionable. Credibility is undermined by the cherry-picking of information, which 
affects the reliability of what is produced. The initiator’s attempt to advocate for a 
particular proposal blocks participation by critical actors and undermines their 
concerns, limiting fairness and the perceived legitimacy of the project. However, the 
salience of the findings may be perceived of as high when the experiment acts as a 
means for keeping an idea alive (Greenberg et al. 2003), and outcomes are presented 
when the time is right.  
Now that the model has been explained by connecting learning outcomes to the ideal 
types, the following section tests it for robustness against a case study set in the 
Netherlands. 
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3 Case study application of the framework to an 
experiment in the Netherlands 
This case study serves to illustrate how the above conceptual framework can be 
applied empirically. The experiment puts into practice a change in approach to water 
management- combining flood defence and nature conservation- and was conducted in 
the Dutch Delta’s Oosterschelde (see Figure One), a former estuary in south-west 
Netherlands. The Oosterschelde is a designated national park and a Natura 2000 site 
of European importance. Recognition of national significance is bequeathed because 
the estuary sandbars, intertidal flats, and salt marshes provide foraging and resting 
places for migratory birds and other wildlife. The estuary is also the site of a large 
storm surge barrier- the “Oosterscheldekering”. This flood protection barrier is part of 
the Delta Works, a vast engineering programme undertaken to protect the Netherlands 
from flood risk. The intertidal flats also minimise wave damage to the barrier by 
buffering it during storm surges. Unfortunately, the storm surge barrier has inhibited 
the tidal flow in and out of the estuary, which in turn disrupts the erosion and 
replacement of sand so the flats are slowly drowning (Climate Proof Areas Brochure 
2010) putting the wildlife habitat at risk and potentially increasing damage to the 
flood barriers.  
 
Figure 1 Map of case study area (map sourced from © OpenStreetMap 
contributors).  
There is no precedent to managing these issues, so the enforcement arm of the 
Ministry of Infrastructure and Environment, Rijkswaterstaat (Department for Waterways 
and Public Works; referred to here as “RWS”), together with knowledge consortium 
Ecoshape, experimented with “soft approaches”, whereby they tested innovative 
management interventions that can potentially slow down the rate of erosion; 
including a sand nourishment (experiment A) and the construction of sand stabilising 
oyster reefs (experiment B). These projects are a departure from the typical “hard” 
engineering measures used by RWS to maintain the dikes, and they hypothesised that 
the measures will reduce dike maintenance costs while restoring nature. The 
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intervention (experiment A and B together) stands out as an innovative experiment 
that will help determine whether or not RWS takes the soft solution approach, and 
manage dike safety and ecological restoration together as part of their water 
management planning in the future (RWS 2009), thus classifying it at as a management 
intervention specifically designed to inform policy (Steffen 2009; Huitema et al. 2009). 
The experiment’s monitoring mechanisms were scientific-i.e. the morphological and 
ecological effects of sand nourishment and oyster beds, but there was also an 
objective to engage local stakeholders and build trust and legitimacy into the project. 
Permits were required because the experiment was conducted in a Natura 2000 
protected area.  
3.1 Methodology 
To collect data, documents such as project reports, media articles, scientific articles, 
conservation reports, meeting minutes, email correspondence, and regulatory 
applications were analysed and six semi-structured interviews were conducted on the 
phone or in person. Data was also collected via an online survey. A pilot study to test 
the survey was conducted on professionals known by the researchers. The survey 
consisted of closed questions, but allowed respondents the opportunity to comment in 
an open section at the end. Questions were asked to gauge the institutional factors 
and learning effects. For this case study, 25 survey links were sent to the identified 
participants in the projects, and 20 responses were collected, giving an 80% response 
rate. Learning can be measured a number of ways, and a common method is to assess 
observed products of learning; for instance, policy changes, new projects, or new 
strategies (Bennett and Howlett 1992, Armitage et al. 2008, Gerlak and Heikkila 2011). 
An alternative method is to measure the process of learning, where new information or 
knowledge is acquired, processed, and transferred across individuals within a group 
(Gerlak and Heikkila 2011), and measured via each individual “reporting” their 
experiences through survey or interview. This research utilised the second method via 
a survey with experiment participants. Learning effects were measured with questions 
based on those found in the literature (e.g. Schusler et al. 2003, Muro and Jeffrey 
2012, Leach et al. 2013), using Likert-scale survey questions, which asked respondents 
to rate their experience on a four point scale: 1= “not at all”, 2= “slightly”, 3= “a 
moderate change”, 4= “a considerable change”. The mean is provided below to assess 
the extent of learning effects from the experiment. The extent of learning in the policy 
network was assessed using indicators of the credibility, salience, and legitimacy, 
along with interview and survey data from policy actors and non-state participants. 
3.2 Results and discussion 
In order to establish whether the experiment fits any of the aforementioned ideal 
types, this section teases out the rule settings in accordance with the above 
framework. It also assesses whether the measured learning effects meet the expected 
hypothesis. Discussion points are then raised about the suitability of the framework to 
assess learning, along with observed limitations and suggestions for future research. 
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Table 3 Rule settings for the experiment.  
Institutional 
rules 
Results 
Boundary rules 
Access granted to scientific experts, state actors, and industry actors. State 
actors represent national and regional government. Participants invited to 
join. 
Position rules State was initiator and primary funder.  
Information 
rules 
Information produced was predominantly scientific information. Some lay 
information used in design phase of experiment B. Emphasis was on 
instrumental information and reflexive information extended to awareness 
of policy goals. Communication channels reported as open and information 
regularly received. Knowledge transmitted to general public through press 
releases. Participants had face-to-face contact through workshops. 
Aggregation 
rules 
State ultimately made decisions on project goals and design. The state took 
decisions on the execution of experiment A; the expert collaborative on 
experiment B. Evaluation and conclusions decided upon consensually by 
state and scientific experts. 
Choice rules 
The majority of participants reported holding advisory or decision making 
power roles at the monitoring and evaluation nodes. The least equitable 
power balance was at the design node. 
Payoff rules State paid most costs with contribution from research collaboration. 
 
Our empirical analysis indicates that the experiment’s rule settings most resemble the 
technocratic ideal type. The boundary rules are set heavily in favour of scientific 
experts, with minor representation of business and policy interests. However, on 
closer analysis, it emerged that civil society actors were invited into the process, but 
decided to take an observational stance (although a civil group is involved in the 
steering committee that received the results, and advised decision makers). They 
viewed the proposal as positive for both safety and nature, whereas industry actors 
perceived the intervention as potentially negative on their interests. Concerns were 
raised over impacts on recreational uses of the Oosterschelde if the management 
approach was formally adopted into policy but for the experimental phase civil groups 
did not feel the need to participate (Joop Stalenburg, telephone interview, April 2013). 
It emerged that participants were already very familiar with each other, as the 
Oosterschelde is a system supporting a balance of sensitive interests and the 
participants have all been working there for some time. The research institutes have a 
strong working relationship with the fishermen and they regularly pass knowledge 
between each other, so despite the project being innovative, the actor network was 
not. Examining information rules, the results indicate this experiment had an open and 
regular exchange between participants and open distribution to the public as a whole 
through the BwN’s open access “wiki” site. However, on closer analysis the exchange of 
information was highest among scientific experts, and most open during the design of 
the experiment, which skews the categorisation towards the technocratic type, 
because information was not shared evenly across the whole circle of participants. The 
experiment investigated scientific hypotheses, so scientific information about the 
natural world was dominant; however, non-scientific lay information was used to 
design and implement experiment B, since the scientists had limited knowledge of 
oysters and useable substrate materials (Ysebaert interview, Yserke, December 2012). 
Both advocacy and boundary types value lay knowledge, although advocacy 
experiments limit it to that which supports the dominant interest. It is hard to evaluate 
in this instance because the fishermen’s knowledge was practical and non-contentious. 
The experiment did not encourage the development of reflexive knowledge, although 
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some participants recalled discussion over policy objectives. Finally, regarding the 
authority rules, graph 1 below illustrates the distribution of authority at the three 
stages; the design, monitoring, and evaluation nodes. Degrees of authority were 
assigned as: not involved, received information, participant had advisory role, 
participant had decision power. We conclude from the graph that the evaluation node 
had more distributed power than the design or monitoring phases, and the design 
phase had the least shared power. Closer analysis shows that state actors were mainly 
responsible for the design phase, with few experts having any say at all (hinting at a 
technocratic or advocacy type), whereas scientific experts held decision power over the 
monitoring and evaluation stages.  
 
Figure 2 Shows the extent that power was shared over decision nodes in the 
experiment. The columns show the numbers of participants with differing 
degrees of authority (power nodes) which illustrates the extent of their 
authority to influence the experiment at each of the design, monitoring, 
and evaluation stages.  
In conclusion, since the rules are set to include mostly scientific experts who are 
assigned authority at nodes of their expertise, and who regularly and openly sharing 
scientific and non-reflexive information, it is concluded that on the whole this 
experiment is primarily a technocratic ideal type. In regards to learning, the 
hypotheses state that a technocratic ideal type creates high cognitive learning effects, 
no normative learning, low relational learning and results that are considered credible 
by policy makers. The results are surprising (see Table 4 below) in that some 
normative and relational learning was reported; in particular the relational learning was 
unexpectedly high. The levels may reflect the fact that the experiment is not a perfect 
fit to the ideal type, as it had broader authority distribution than expected, and sharing 
of reflexive knowledge. The results also indicate how some rule settings have blanket 
influence over all types of learning. For example, the open and regular sharing of 
information increases both relational and cognitive learning, as participants would get 
to understand how others interpret the problem while increasing their knowledge of 
the experiment. We have not found examples of studies that isolate the variables that 
influence specific types of learning, and this could be an interesting direction for 
learning scholarship to take. Moreover, the institutional rules may not be extensive 
enough to explain the normative learning, which may be the result of forces beyond 
the institutional setting - the involvement of a charismatic leader for example (Gerlak 
and Heikkila 2011). 
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Table 4 Learning measurements from the survey, where participants responded to 
questions about the change in their understanding, views, and 
relationships. 
Cognitive learning 3.3 
Normative learning 2.5 
Relational learning 3.0 
(Out of 4: where >3.0 is high; 2.5- 3.0 is medium, and <2.5 is low). 
Finally, an assessment is made of the quality of the experiment’s results against the 
proxy learning indicators credibility, salience, and legitimacy. To understand the 
extent to which the results were credible, they were examined to see whether there 
were any critical questions raised from the policy side. The initiator reported no 
criticism or questioning of results, and suggested policy makers recognized the caliber 
of the knowledge institution contracted to perform the monitoring work (van Zanten, 
interview, March, 2014). In addition, larger sand supplementations are now planned 
for the Oosterschelde based on these results, which illustrates the confidence decision 
makers have in the results of this experiment (in line with findings from Greenberg et 
al. 2003 that policy makers view scientifically established results as definitive). To 
establish how salient the results were, we looked at whether there has been a change 
in how relevant the policy issues are after five years, and whether there has been a 
suggested alternative course of action. What we found is that Dutch water governance 
is still intent on pursuing solutions that solve nature and water safety policy problems 
concurrently, for instance as mentioned in the south-western Delta programme. By 
focusing on improving safety while restoring nature, the government can require buy-
in from conservation groups, and only spend state money on safety solutions (van 
Zanten, interview, March, 2014). We also consider the collaboration with consortium 
Ecoshape as a strengthener of the experiment’s policy relevance, as it transformed the 
experiment from a state-run safety and nature project to a highly visible and well 
publicized demonstration of a fashionable principle. So, there was no proposed 
alternative action, but rather an upgrading of the original project into something more 
visible. Finally, the legitimacy of the results can be understood as how equitable the 
process was, in particular, how the stakeholders’ concerns were met. Here too, the 
experiment scores well, as it developed with industry stakeholders a reporting system 
that would alert participants to adverse effects caused by the sand supplement, with a 
ceiling effect arranged so operations could be halted if the effects proved too much. 
The extent of industry involvement beyond appeasement is less clear, as they were not 
involved in the final workshop, evaluation, or presentation of results. However, the 
Oosterschelde National Park had a representative sitting on the steering committee, 
and they felt satisfied with the extent stakeholders were involved in the process 
(Kramer, email correspondence, March, 2014).  
On the whole the experiment is strong regarding the indicators for effectiveness. It is 
acknowledged that these results may be explained not only by the experimental 
design, but also by external factors; for example, the political awareness of climate 
change solutions for the Netherlands (sand supplementation and oyster beds were 
touted as climate change solutions in the EU programme “Climate Proof Areas”), and 
the strong support society gives to projects that improve safety. Further, as with 
relational learning, assessing legitimacy neglects to take into account how established 
the actor network is in the area prior to the experiment, and managing the 
Oosterschelde has long been an example of the Dutch “polder model” of consensus-
based management.  
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It is concluded that despite not fitting perfectly, the framework captures a range of 
institutional factors that potentially enable learning. Further, the real world application 
shows both the depth of analysis achievable, and allows the framing of 
recommendations. However, an important ‘warning’ observation about using rules to 
define independent variables is the expectation that they are choices to be made, but 
although in some cases they are not. For example, with the boundary rules in this 
case, legal requirements (being situated in a Natura 2000 area) meant the initiators 
were obliged to invite all stakeholders into the process. The regulations would make it 
very difficult for the initiators to keep particular parties out. Conducting the 
experiment in a non-restricted area would have solved this, but then the state would 
not be compelled to find a solution in the first place. On the whole, the rules offer 
choices to designers, and although a charismatic leader would be desirable, it is not 
that easy to choose for. By restricting our analysis to institutional factors, our 
recommendations give designers some control.  
3.3 Limitations 
The exploratory research presented here has a number of limitations that also suggest 
directions for further research. The first limitation we wish to mention is conceptual in 
nature. Acting on the claim that the literature on experimentation is still somewhat 
weak or inconsistent, a systematic institutional approach was deliberately proposed. 
This approach functions well in anchoring the typology of experiments. However, an 
institutional lens is necessarily limiting, and future research should also pay attention 
to, or control for, other factors that might have relevance for explaining the learning 
effects. For example, control for what could be labeled ‘agency factors’ in the 
experiment circle: the quality of the leadership of experiment initiator; the 
demographics of participants, extent of motivation etc. (see for instance Gerlak and 
Heikkila, 2011; Leach et al. 2013). Regarding learning in the policy circle, legislation 
that may or may not curtail the space for experimentation has already been alluded to. 
But the relations in the policy system may also vary considerably – the parties involved 
(e.g. regulators and interest groups) may be either in an antagonistic or in a 
collaborative relationship. This might be quite important for the type of experiment 
that is feasible, but it will certainly also have implications for the perceptions of the 
outcomes of the experiment in policy circles.  
In terms of the empirical approach used here, several limitations need mentioning. The 
first is that the analysis outlined here is based, at least partially, on self-reported 
insights into learning, measured after the experiment only. Self-reported learning 
scores are recognized as likely to be biased to some extent (Haug et al. 2011), and 
measurements of learning effects should preferably be based on pre- and post- 
experiment data, which were unfortunately not available for this study, as there was a 
need to focus on completed experiments. One future avenue of research would be to 
apply the framework to an experiment that is yet to start, and take learning 
measurements before and after the experiment (see for instance Huitema et al. 2010). 
The current application to just one case study is suitable for a test application, but 
there is a need for additional quantitative and qualitative work. We intend to follow up 
the current article with the construction of a large scale database that contains 
multiple experiments. On the basis of such a database, statistical analysis of the 
correlation between experiment design and learning effects can be established more 
firmly. And further qualitative research would be necessary – for instance in a select 
number of cases of experiments – to better assess what are the casual dynamics 
underlying the patterns of correlation that are found. Such research could also pay 
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attention to the connections between learning within the experiment on the one hand, 
and learning effects in the wider policy environment on the other; for example, do 
strong learning effects in the experiment lead to a positively perceived impact in the 
policy network? If not, why not? 
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4 Conclusions 
Policy experimentation is a concept that is gaining importance in academic and policy 
discourse, due to its function as an institutional arrangement that promises to improve 
policy and management in the context of social-ecological uncertainty and feedback. 
Yet experimentation has quite specific meanings in different scientific fields, ranging 
from testing the effects of a policy innovation, to capturing an innovative and novel 
approach that sits outside the status quo. A useful definition should capture both the 
evaluative and novel aspects of the concept, and set the course for identification and 
analysis of experiments for future research, as well as inform policy discussions and 
governance strategies that want to apply a more adaptive approach to policy making. 
As an innovative framework that connects experiments and learning, it is argued that 
on the basis of the case study that the design features identified are relevant to 
different learning effects, and can contribute to future systematic assessments of 
learning within experiments, as long as the identified concerns (e.g. the lack of some 
choices, drawbacks of self-reported learning, focus on institutional factors) are 
acknowledged. It is concluded that the case study in question, a policy experiment 
assessing the impact of taking the “soft approach” by combining coastal defence and 
ecological restoration, adequately captured the temporary and flexible nature of the 
concept, and enable an understanding to be developed of how experiments can be 
used to both test a scientific approach, as well as gauge how the social world responds 
to the suggested policy change. It also highlighted the fact that policy approaches that 
are supported by the local population may not draw parties into the process despite 
open access, thus minimising the chances to learn from local actors.  
Sketching a conceptual relationship between experimentation and learning is the first 
step in building a robust understanding of how experiments can be designed to 
enhance learning outcomes. The next step, testing, will validate the carefully 
constructed claims. This explorative research is considered timely because it unpacks 
a relationship between two concepts, which are often held up as an antidote to policy 
making by spurious certitude. As key prescriptions in adaptive management, 
experimentation and learning enable us to better cope with the uncertainties that arise 
in modern environmental governance. 
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